SAR Discussion -

[mahony]

I considered writing this immediately after the event, but I wasn't sure I should. This seems like the best forum so here goes.....

I have been hiking most of my life from Boy Scouts until now. I have hiked all over the world, solo and in groups, winter and summer. I have made some bad hiking decisions and been able to self rescue via wits and good gear.

Last year (July 7th, 2022) I was involved in a SAR event on Mt. Moosilaukee:

I was hiking with a group broken into 2 sub groups to ascend and descend via the Gorge Brook Trail. Beautiful weather clear, warm and no rain forecast. Unfortunately the second group (I was in the first group) missed the very first turn and headed up Ridge Trail instead of the left turn toward the Lodge and Gorge Brook Trail (factor #1). At the summit I waited for the second group to emerge from the trees on Gorge Brook and could see nor hear any sign of them. Just as I was going to head down to check to see if they had turned back I saw someone coming across from the Beaver Brook side. That hiker was part of the group and told me the following: we took the trail but we have a straggler who is moving slowly. 1st group leaves the summit and heads down the way they came up. I wait for the second group to assemble, but the last hiker (with adult) is far behind (5 hikers seriously stretched out - factor #2). I asked how far back was this hiker.....unknown. Afternoon is getting late....3pm at the summit and we should be going or gone (factor #3). I tell group #2 to wait; I grab extra water and food and go down beaver brook trail and meet the straggler. I took all weight from the straggler....he is 14 years old and about 160 lbs. He is moving along slowly, but doing OK. We finally summit around 4-4:30 ish....we take a few pictures, but the straggler is not ready to head down. I tell the rest of group #2 to head down and I will rest with the straggler until he is ready to head down. We leave the summit after 5 pm and make our way slowly down the Gorge Brook Trail; we are moving 100 yards at a time (slowly) and for a minute or 2 at each stop. We are barely below tree line and moving extremely slowly. I'm not too concerned, but now the straggler is having trouble with leg pain and emotionally. Sunset comes and we aren't even close to the bend where the trail meets the brook, so I stop to gear up for a long dark night hike. We have lights, coats, food and water, so we continue on at a crawl. Emotionally this kid is done....tells me to leave him, he cant walk at all, his legs (not muscles) have sharp pain with each step etc. (factor #4).....Now comes my conundrum.

We are safe, no one is going to be harmed by staying overnight. I have plenty of gear (not sleeping bags, but down coats, hats and gloves), the weather is warm and people know exactly where we are. This kid isn't moving with 2+ miles of trail to go. I can spend the night, but can he? Alone, I've been in this situation a million times...no problem. This is the toughest call I've ever had to make; I don't know if he is going to be able to hike in the morning. I can't make a phone call because I have come too far down the ridge, but I do manage to get a text to may wife telling her to call SAR in NH and my precise location on the trail. I text with SAR, explain the situation and again give my precise location.

The lead SAR "pair" is a junior NH Fish and Game Warden and a volunteer. The poor kid is buoyed somewhat by the attention/reassurance and assistance from SAR and we head down again 1 step at a time. The Lead NH Game Warden arrives and he is PISSED. He is calm, but clearly upset at his initial view of the situation. Let me take an aside here to say that 1) I recognize the time and risk involved in a SAR operation...no matter how "good" the conditions 2) I have never even considered calling SAR before this event 3) I appreciate that all of the 32 people who came out were volunteers and it was at least 2am before they got home 4) I do not want to see SAR resources wasted on frivolous rescues and 5) I honestly feel that given the conditions I made the right call.

With the entire SAR crew we moved down the trail with a volunteer on each arm for about 45 minutes and we still hadn't reached the turn at the Brook. The Lead Warden at that point decided to put the hiker on the gurney and wheel him down the mountain, so that we "weren't here all night". Another hour and we made it to the lodge parking lot. At that point it seemed the Lead Warden could see that I was out of options when I made the call. I spent some time with the Junior Warden giving specifics of the hike and the night, and he did remind me that SAR will charge people for unnecessary or negligent calls. He was understanding and didn't think this fell into the "chargeable" category. I then thanked the volunteers for their time and took the hiker back home. End of drama.

The reason for writing this is the whole SAR issue. I have never been a big fan of a hiker tax (with the difficulty to levy that fairly) and I am a big fan of the freedom hiking provides. I recognize that people are often unprepared and that most of the time they make it up and down Mount Lafayette in sneakers in snow without a recordable problem (as did my boss in 2011). I also know that SAR is underfunded to the extent that they have to rely on a massive volunteer effort. I recognize my role or "things I would do differently" and I can see how the 4 factors listed above led to the SAR call. The problem is that I was left with the feeling that I would never call SAR again...and I don't think that is the right answer either. I'm asking for thoughts from the community (and I know we have SAR volunteers here....some of you may have been at this event). I'm not afraid of constructive criticism here, what should I have done differently?

 

[JoshandBaron]

I suffered a Lisfranc fracture about 5 miles up the Great Gulf trail a few years back. I was in a lot of pain and was about the whip out the SPOT and summon help. I had the unit out and my finger on the button when I turned it over and read the statement on the back, something to the effect of "for use in life or death emergency only." So, that's the metric I use to justify a call to SAR. If no one is in danger of dying then I figure it's the hiker's duty to self rescue, regardless of how uncomfortable it is. I had 5 days of supplies on my back and wasn't bleeding out so I wasn't perishing anytime soon. I put the unit away and enjoyed some of the most painful hours of my life.

 

[Rhody Seth]

I don't think you made a bad call considering the age of the hiker. What kind of group hike was this? How well did you know this kid? I feel like that makes a difference. If I was hiking alone and came upon a 14 year old who was struggling to make it any further down the mountain, I'd be comfortable contacting SARS.

But I have a 14 year old and if we found ourselves in a similar situation, I'd probably be much more likely to make us ride it out in the woods.

Tough call and you can only do the best you can in the circumstances.

 

[Grey J]

I think you did the best you could under the circumstances and your choices are well explained and reasonable. The only thing I would question is proceeding to the summit with him and not heading directly down once you encountered him especially given the time of day.

 

[peakbagger]

I have always considered a S&R as a call to qualified incident manager, who then based on whatever input I could supply would make the call on what resources were required. In some cases that may be a F&G employee or in a case with a known issue maybe call out the troops.

I know personally with my ankle, after I went through 911 and then the Gorham dispatcher, I got officer Lucas, explaned my location and situation and then suggested and alternative to litter crew. He used his contacts and I got a ride down from Wildcat Ski patrol who were prepping for ski season. I never actually saw officer Lucas.

IMHO, most untrained people may not be qualified to self assess. I had the obvious severely dislocated foot and most likely broken bones but I also had the beginnings of what I believe was shock which can turn into a much more serious issue. It makes sense that in my situation it would be better for a better trained 3rd party to make the call.

With respect to the supervisor's attitude, everyone has a bad day and F&G has been seriously understaffed for as long as I have been in the area, "its the NH way of government". Of late there has been a revolving door of upper management in the department, usually long timers getting ready to clock out for retirement who want the big retirement pay boost tied to late in the career promotion. They dont have an incentive to rock the boat to fix fundamental staffing issues. I think it comes down to the field supervisors are told to suck it up and use what resources out there and if someone gets that field supervisor after a couple of simultaneous rescues some of the bitterness about the system will come through.

 

[mahony]

I think you did the best you could under the circumstances and your choices are well explained and reasonable. The only thing I would question is proceeding to the summit with him and not heading directly down once you encountered him especially given the time of day.

A reasonable point...but I brought him over the summit because it was the shorter trail back to the vehicle and he was moving along the trail slowly, but steadily. If when I met him he was already "stuck", I would have gone down Beaver Brook Trail as the shortest option to a road.

 

[mahony]

I suffered a Lisfranc fracture about 5 miles up the Great Gulf trail a few years back. I was in a lot of pain and was about the whip out the SPOT and summon help. I had the unit out and my finger on the button when I turned it over and read the statement on the back, something to the effect of "for use in life or death emergency only." So, that's the metric I use to justify a call to SAR. If no one is in danger of dying then I figure it's the hiker's duty to self rescue, regardless of how uncomfortable it is. I had 5 days of supplies on my back and wasn't bleeding out so I wasn't perishing anytime soon. I put the unit away and enjoyed some of the most painful hours of my life.

By myself I probably would have done the same as you; however, if I saw you on the trail in that condition I would have gone to get you some help and not felt bad about it.

 

[skiguy]

Personally I would have kept your group together rather than staying with what became the victim. Not sure of the demographics and or experience of your group but there is power in numbers. Emotional support from the group for the hindered individual plus physical support in the form of shelter building and fire may have been possible with larger numbers at hand. Also considering you were prepared to stick it out for the night. In other words your chances of self rescue may have been greater as a whole rather than a splintered group which in the latter had already caused problems. I was not there as others here so I do not profess to know all the circumstances but you did ask for constructive criticism. Splitting your group up had already resulted in multiple problems. Why create another possible situation to deal with. Stay together.

 

[JoshandBaron]

By myself I probably would have done the same as you; however, if I saw you on the trail in that condition I would have gone to get you some help and not felt bad about it.

You're a better person than the folks on trail that day.

 

[Nessmuk]

During guide training, it is stressed, with numerous bad outcome examples on the books, that a group is never split up, leaving some part of the group behind to fend for themselves, especially if someone is having difficulty traveling or is injured. This responsibility is on the group "leader" and not subject to a "vote". The only exception is with a larger group, if outward communication is not possible, then send three runners to go for help. (Three because in case one is injured, one can continue on for help while the other remains to care for the injured)

 

[TCD]

What I did not see here was background info. Maybe I missed it in the story somewhere?

>What kind of a group was this? (Scouts? Meetup? Social Media? Circle of friends?)
>How was the group "recruited" / "selected?"
>Were group members screened in any way as to ability, experience, fitness?
>Was this individual someone who had done hikes like this before, successfully, so this incident was a surprise? Or did this person not have the experience or fitness to attempt this hike?

It's a pain, and a big job, but all this is the leader's responsibility before the first step into the woods. If you did all this, and this was a surprise, then it's just an unfortunate one off. But if the group wasn't adequately screened, that would go in the column of what you "should have done differently."

 

[sierra]

I don't think you made a bad call, when dealing with minors, probably better to err on the side of caution. That being said, the group was not lead properly. I'm not totally against splitting up a group, but that's only done if you have sufficient leaders to guide each group. With all due respect, anyone that goes the wrong way on Moosilauke with its easily followed and well signed trails, has no business guiding a group of kids or anyone for that matter. Sounds like the Game Warden was having a bad day, it's their job to respond and if they don't like the scene presented to them, they should couch their feelings until they are off the job, the last thing they or anybody wants, is for people to be reluctant to call if they need help. Let's just say you didn't call and for some reason the kid takes a turn for the worse in the middle of the night, the same Warden would read you the riot act for waiting to call. If I was you, I wouldn't lose much sleep over this, life happens then we move on.

 

[Andrew]

There was an unknown medical situation emerging, assuming this was not your child, it was not your choice at this point to make medical decisions for the child; so best to get medical care response in motion.

 

[RollingRock]

Thanks so much for sharing your story. Most people in your situation would not have the guts to share such a story and ask for feedback on top of that! I can tell it's something that haunts you to this day. I think we can always second guess ourselves with something like this to eternity.

I see some points that could be made about what could have been done differently but the #1 thing for me is at the very beginning...when the straggler was slowing group #2 down significantly, there should have been a plan in place to have someone turn around with him and call it a day...the straggler was putting everyone at risk from the start.

That said, sh*t happens, every circumstance if different, and you did the best you could under those circumstances. I understand the need to talk this through though. This experience may never fade from memory but the emotions attached to it will once you've reconciled this internally. You stepped up in this situation to take upon something that was not doing to begin with. Well done!

 

[Dr. Dasypodidae]

Yeah, I was there with probably 30 others on my SAR team and we were pleading to put your patient in our litter from the get go as we can move a litter much faster than a hobbling hiker. My SAR team spends a lot of time assisting NHF&G on Moosilauke, usually in the dark, so we know the mountain inside out.

A funny anecdote is that one of our SAR team members missed the turn up Gorge Brook and ended up summiting via the Snapper and Carriage Road and barely caught up with us just above Ravine Lodge on the way out as we were really moving fast with the litter. This team member took a lot ribbing from the rest of us after that one.

 

[NHRANGER]

All-in all I believe you did the correct thing. It's really hard to deal with a hiker who is just plain exhausted, and even with 30 SAR team members, a litter-carry is not risk-free, and we've treated litter carriers who injure themselves in the process. It's actually easier, at least as far as planning and execution, to deal with someone with a major injury.

I've had situations in which I've just walked very slowly with someone who is exhausted, or has a minor injury. Even walking backwards to help them with foot placement and to highlight rocks and water bars. Drives me crazy.

In general, we don't carry people out who have upper body injuries (arm, shoulders, even minor TBIs) and we try, try not to have to carry someone who has an ankle sprain- the assisted hobble is much less resource-intensive and much safer, yet exhausting for the rescuer who is helping the person out. It's far harder to walk at such a snail's pace, and it's easy to get impatient and frustrated. At times I've also gotten stiff, and cold, so I've left the pt and run up and down maybe a 1/4 mile to heat up, or overcome boredom. I'm wondering why your other group members weren't there to provide support for the kid and for you, maybe taking turns assisting- maybe they were- not sure I read the story correctly.

The member who mentioned starting a fire- that's a very good thing to do. It lifts everyone's spirits and everyone suddenly feels it's all going to be ok. The patient will sometimes feel this way too, and just get up and keep on moving.

As for NHFG, their upper management is solid. Very committed to and experienced with SAR. I will say some of the COs you might see on a rescue can get impatient, as I would get, when they come across something that just seems (to them) kind of dumb. Their days start early and then they go home at 5pm or so, if they are lucky, only to get called out for a rescue. It's a grueling job.

On most similar (exhaustion) situations I've made sure the pt had plenty to eat, drink, and even rest for a while and then keep pressing downhill. In a few cases, however, it was clear that this was not going to work. In one case two women- an older woman and her adult daughter- were so exhausted we found a way to get a tent to them, set them up at a nice (unfortunately, illegal) camp spot, set up a stove and provided food, sleeping bags, and went home so we could also rest. Come back early the next morning to find two very well-rested and eager hikers ready to complete their trip. I understand that in this case that would not have been an option, with a minor. Since we all carry 24-hour packs in SAR, we could in fact stay with someone and keep them warm and rested and fed, at least in a few cases.

In many cases in the 1990's- I think it's different now- the CO fielding the call might give the hiker instructions for surviving the night, and early the next morning after everyone has had some rest you'd see 7 or 8 green trucks as well as SAR team members, at the trailhead. I don't think that approach would have worked here.

Every SAR incident is different, and mistakes are made- I found myself just a few days ago debriefing a rescue from 2 years ago, with a CO who was on it, and I learned a lot that I didn't know at the time, about both the (complex) rescue, and my own mistakes- and what I will do different next time.

 

[mahony]

Yeah, I was there with probably 30 others on my SAR team and we were pleading to put your patient in our litter from the get go as we can move a litter much faster than a hobbling hiker. My SAR team spends a lot of time assisting NHF&G on Moosilauke, usually in the dark, so we know the mountain inside out.

A funny anecdote is that one of our SAR team members missed the turn up Gorge Brook and ended up summiting via the Snapper and Carriage Road and barely caught up with us just above Ravine Lodge on the way out as we were really moving fast with the litter. This team member took a lot ribbing from the rest of us after that one.

I was at the back and I remember him catching us at the very end. Thanks for coming out that night.

 

[mahony]

I appreciate all the replies. This was a camp group that I was not in charge of, and as mentioned by some here, lack of leadership was a significant factor in what happened. I have some planning to do to make sure this doesn't happen again.

 

[nartreb]

A few issues stood out to me:
1) Unclear leadership roles, and, paradoxically, lack of consultation in decision-making. In your initial report it sounded like you were in charge, or took charge. ("I tell group #2 to wait...") Did you present other options to group #1 or group #2? At the end, did you ask the 14-year-old's input about whether to call SaR? It never hurts to canvass a group for information or options you might not have considered, and this can be done in a way that does not diminish your authority.
2) failure of (sub-) groups to stay together, total lack of communication. First group did not know where second group was, second group had no idea how far back the 14yo was. I'm not entirely clear on the various groups' respective paces, but I suspect it would have been wise for the 14yo to turn around, long before the first parts of the second group actually reached the summit. (Second group should have had one or two people descend with him, and if desired send two or more on to summit and hopefully rendezvous with and inform the first group.)
3) "Retreat" via the summit. There is something about the human brain that biases us towards this option. I don't know whether this was the right call in this particular case, I'm just making a general point that one should be skeptical of this option when one finds oneself in a sticky situation. Going up means expending effort and increasing exposure to weather. It means you are largely committed to NOT bivouacing anytime soon. You made that decision prematurely: you told group 2 to wait for you, before you had seen the boy's condition or even knew exactly where he was. This meant you had already decided to return to the summit.
4) Possible lack of first aid training. You didn't mention supplying the 14yo with sugar and water, or write anything that would indicate you did a physical or cognitive assessment. Still, there doesn't seem to have been anything wrong with the boy besides fatigue. For that, the obvious treatment seems to be: rest, i.e., bivouac.
5) Some unclear factor making you reluctant to bivouac. You specifically mention that the weather was OK, and you had sufficient gear, so I'm not clear why you seemed reluctant to spend the night on the trail. You say you would have been OK by yourself, but were worried about the boy. Why? That's the part I really don't understand. "I don't know if he is going to be able to hike in the morning." Why not?

I realize I'm discounting the "shooting pains in his legs" - they don't make much sense except as psychosomatic (plus, I know that, later, SaR didn't seem at all concerned about them). So maybe #4 and #5 are related.

None of your decisions were terrible and the outcome was good. A number of issues have been well discussed above, including the obvious "don't leave a novice hiker alone" and "don't send the rest of the group ahead if they might be helpful in the rescue". I hope I've added a few more points for consideration. There's a theory in accident study that it's usually an accumulation of small things that go wrong. I found it interesting that some of your smaller, earlier choices weighed against the choice to bivouac, maybe without you realizing it.

 

[skiguy]

A few issues stood out to me:
1) Unclear leadership roles, and, paradoxically, lack of consultation in decision-making. In your initial report it sounded like you were in charge, or took charge. ("I tell group #2 to wait...") Did you present other options to group #1 or group #2? At the end, did you ask the 14-year-old's input about whether to call SaR? It never hurts to canvass a group for information or options you might not have considered, and this can be done in a way that does not diminish your authority.
2) failure of (sub-) groups to stay together, total lack of communication. First group did not know where second group was, second group had no idea how far back the 14yo was. I'm not entirely clear on the various groups' respective paces, but I suspect it would have been wise for the 14yo to turn around, long before the first parts of the second group actually reached the summit. (Second group should have had one or two people descend with him, and if desired send two or more on to summit and hopefully rendezvous with and inform the first group.)
3) "Retreat" via the summit. There is something about the human brain that biases us towards this option. I don't know whether this was the right call in this particular case, I'm just making a general point that one should be skeptical of this option when one finds oneself in a sticky situation. Going up means expending effort and increasing exposure to weather. It means you are largely committed to NOT bivouacing anytime soon. You made that decision prematurely: you told group 2 to wait for you, before you had seen the boy's condition or even knew exactly where he was. This meant you had already decided to return to the summit.
4) Possible lack of first aid training. You didn't mention supplying the 14yo with sugar and water, or write anything that would indicate you did a physical or cognitive assessment. Still, there doesn't seem to have been anything wrong with the boy besides fatigue. For that, the obvious treatment seems to be: rest, i.e., bivouac.
5) Some unclear factor making you reluctant to bivouac. You specifically mention that the weather was OK, and you had sufficient gear, so I'm not clear why you seemed reluctant to spend the night on the trail. You say you would have been OK by yourself, but were worried about the boy. Why? That's the part I really don't understand. "I don't know if he is going to be able to hike in the morning." Why not?

I realize I'm discounting the "shooting pains in his legs" - they don't make much sense except as psychosomatic (plus, I know that, later, SaR didn't seem at all concerned about them). So maybe #4 and #5 are related.

None of your decisions were terrible and the outcome was good. A number of issues have been well discussed above, including the obvious "don't leave a novice hiker alone" and "don't send the rest of the group ahead if they might be helpful in the rescue". I hope I've added a few more points for consideration. There's a theory in accident study that it's usually an accumulation of small things that go wrong. I found it interesting that some of your smaller, earlier choices weighed against the choice to bivouac, maybe without you realizing it.

Well written. I totally agree with your last two sentences referring to a domino like effect or snowballing. Time and time again instances can be traced back to a series of smaller situations. Which are not recognized by leadership and or the group at large. Positive and negative outdoor experiences over time in the outdoors can help one identify these triggers. Life in general not just hiking one can learn to identify and trust gut like feelings or maybe just call it intuition to prevent an unwanted situation before it occurs. Again I am glad that this group’s end result was good. Kudos to the OP reaching asking and answering questions in an appropriate manner.