Avalanche resulting in rescue Great Gulf.

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dave.m said:
That's a terrifying injury, actually.

Also a pretty sobering full accident report as it seems they did everything by the book.
https://www.mountwashingtonavalanch...alanche-airplane-gully-great-gulf-wilderness/
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Backcountry Avalanche Forecast:
On December 9, MWAC had published a current General Advisory. The bottom line stated, “Watch out for isolated areas of unstable snow at middle and upper elevations which could avalanche from the weight of a person. Use proper route finding to avoid these areas and evaluate the snowpack carefully when in steep terrain where snow has collected. Falls in steep terrain can be consequential because of the hazards still present in the early season snowpack.”
 
Sounds like this was literally a life-saving effort by all involved. Great work by everyone starting with the fellow skiers who were first responders out of necessity. Very impressive coordination leading to the best possible outcome given the circumstances.
 
skiguy said:
Backcountry Avalanche Forecast:
On December 9, MWAC had published a current General Advisory. The bottom line stated, “Watch out for isolated areas of unstable snow at middle and upper elevations which could avalanche from the weight of a person. Use proper route finding to avoid these areas and evaluate the snowpack carefully when in steep terrain where snow has collected. Falls in steep terrain can be consequential because of the hazards still present in the early season snowpack.”
Click to expand...

Nod. I was thinking about this passage in the accident report discussion.

"Finally, it’s important to remember that we can seemingly be doing everything right and still have an avalanche accident. We gain experience, take courses, read the avalanche forecast, make slope-specific assessments, and practice good terrain management to reduce our risk in the mountains, but we can never fully eliminate that risk."

TBH, I've never understood the utility of digging pits in the Presidentials, given the propensity of localized wind loading. As this event shows, digging a pit here tells you nothing about the stability over there. Seems to me that the better play would be if recent weather makes wind loading possible, even if it is localized, then stay out of avalanche terrain.

Not blaming these guys in any way. I'm questioning the training that cajoles people into trusting an untrustworthy indicator of event likelihood.
 
dave.m said:
Nod. I was thinking about this passage in the accident report discussion.

"Finally, it’s important to remember that we can seemingly be doing everything right and still have an avalanche accident. We gain experience, take courses, read the avalanche forecast, make slope-specific assessments, and practice good terrain management to reduce our risk in the mountains, but we can never fully eliminate that risk."

TBH, I've never understood the utility of digging pits in the Presidentials, given the propensity of localized wind loading. As this event shows, digging a pit here tells you nothing about the stability over there. Seems to me that the better play would be if recent weather makes wind loading possible, even if it is localized, then stay out of avalanche terrain.

Not blaming these guys in any way. I'm questioning the training that cajoles people into trusting an untrustworthy indicator of event likelihood.
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Blame is a pretty strong word and now a days many see it’s use as politically incorrect. When it comes to accidents in The White Mountains we can all learn by analyzing and discussing these incidents without demeaning the individuals involved. IMO this whole incident is a prime example of heuristic errors. In this case the observation of the victim seeing another skier ski the terrain where the incident occurred unscathed more than likely sent the message that it was then safe to continue himself. An error on his part if so. Accidents in the mountains much of the time can be attributed to an evolvement of events. For example not internalizing the warnings that were given in this situation and then traveling directly into the type of terrain that the warning was given about. Skiing a leeward slope and expecting no hang fire was also a heuristic error. As far as digging pits in The Presies I believe they are totally useful but must be applied on the same aspect you are skiing. I have skied this same gully multiple times. In almost every case under Winter conditions it has also entailed a rappel into that terrain for inspection before actually skiing it. Realistically it is easy for anyone to Monday morning QB these incidents. Which is exactly what I am doing here. When in truth if you were not actually there it can only be an educated observation. For that matter even if you were there you may not have a clear picture of what occurred. I do not agree that these skiers did everything right and **** still happened beyond their control. Some things need to be said and pussy footing around it does no one any good in the long run. I do hope this individual sees a full recovery. He is lucky to be alive.
 
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Apparently this guy was a guide for Redline Guiding. Saw a post on Facebook with a link to a GoFundMe page. Really nasty leg break (post had an X-Ray pic). Hope he recovers fully. They seem to have a really good group of people at Redline.

I'm curious what it is that people feel the group did wrong? All the accounts I've read of the incident make it sound to me like they did everything by the book, were well prepared and trained, etc. To me it seemed like it was just one of those "even if you do everything right it does not guarantee your safety" type of scenarios. Stuff happens. But I'm not a backcountry skiier.
 
In fact another skier proceeded them down the gully without incident. Your mileage might vary!

Not ascending a gully prior to descent makes it difficult to have a complete picture of conditions.
 
W
NHChris said:
In fact another skier proceeded them down the gully without incident. Your mileage might vary!

Not ascending a gully prior to descent makes it difficult to have a complete picture of conditions.
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Welcome to the newby ;)
 
skiguy said:
Skiing a leeward slope and expecting no hang fire was also a heuristic error. As far as digging pits in The Presies I believe they are totally useful but must be applied on the same aspect you are skiing.
Click to expand...

I've worked in a field in which risk management is central for over 30 years. IMO, all risk management entails reliance on heuristics and turns on human decision making that has been shaped by eons of evolutionary biology.

Generally risk is modeled as a statically based probability along the lines of Risk = Likelihood x Impact. Heated debate after this point is to be expected as the math gets very hand wavy very fast. And at the foundation of the mess is are unfounded assumptions that one has access to data that is comparable and statistically significant enough to be predictive.

IMO, you can't dig enough pits on the leeward aspects of the Presis to have any predictive confidence. Much better to take a safety engineering approach and treat likelihood as a binary and to focus one's risk judgement on the impact. If there is a non-zero likelihood of unstable conditions, just assume it will happen and make decisions accordingly (that is, simply don't go there).

There are 2 closely related human cognition issues that I hold to when dealing with risk. The first is the warfighter's problem in which there is a pre-commitment to the mission. In this case, you can't take the safety engineer's approach so one is more compelled to make risk judgements on heuristics, particularly around likelihoods. Often businesses approach risk in a manner similar to warfighters in that they are pre-committed to operating first and foremost and managing risk on the back end of that commitment.

A psychological factor for those of us who play in the mountains is whether we are warfighters or safety engineers. Mostly I think we (as a specie) are inherently "warfighters" who tend to pre-commit to a goal regardless of whether it's a matter of survival or recreation. Or putting it another way, our evolutionary biology wires us for dealing with heuristic judgments for survival but not so much for recreation.

The second issue is risk compensation theory, which I firmly believe plays a bigger role in managing recreational risk than we want to admit. As Paul Petzhold noted, if you carry a helmet, you're more likely to climb into the face of rock fall hazards.

I would have to be convinced that more avi pits would become trustablly predictive on likelihoods.
 
dave.m said:
I've worked in a field in which risk management is central for over 30 years. IMO, all risk management entails reliance on heuristics and turns on human decision making that has been shaped by eons of evolutionary biology.

Generally risk is modeled as a statically based probability along the lines of Risk = Likelihood x Impact. Heated debate after this point is to be expected as the math gets very hand wavy very fast. And at the foundation of the mess is are unfounded assumptions that one has access to data that is comparable and statistically significant enough to be predictive.

IMO, you can't dig enough pits on the leeward aspects of the Presis to have any predictive confidence. Much better to take a safety engineering approach and treat likelihood as a binary and to focus one's risk judgement on the impact. If there is a non-zero likelihood of unstable conditions, just assume it will happen and make decisions accordingly (that is, simply don't go there).

There are 2 closely related human cognition issues that I hold to when dealing with risk. The first is the warfighter's problem in which there is a pre-commitment to the mission. In this case, you can't take the safety engineer's approach so one is more compelled to make risk judgements on heuristics, particularly around likelihoods. Often businesses approach risk in a manner similar to warfighters in that they are pre-committed to operating first and foremost and managing risk on the back end of that commitment.

A psychological factor for those of us who play in the mountains is whether we are warfighters or safety engineers. Mostly I think we (as a specie) are inherently "warfighters" who tend to pre-commit to a goal regardless of whether it's a matter of survival or recreation. Or putting it another way, our evolutionary biology wires us for dealing with heuristic judgments for survival but not so much for recreation.

The second issue is risk compensation theory, which I firmly believe plays a bigger role in managing recreational risk than we want to admit. As Paul Petzhold noted, if you carry a helmet, you're more likely to climb into the face of rock fall hazards.

I would have to be convinced that more avi pits would become trustablly predictive on likelihoods.
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Well said and on point. Your warfighter and safety engineer's analogy are especially well taken.
 
I've been in one avalanche that carried me quite far and I have had a slope drop out from under me without sliding and was able to traverse off that slope. Winter travel involves risk, you can mitigate it, but you can't take it away. I solo and in both instances was by myself, had not dug a pit and just climbed along because things seemed good. If my incident made FB Im sure it would have been scrutinized to no end. Not that scientific, but imo, sometimes you just have bad luck out there, its not bowling. There are only three sports: bull fighting, mountain climbing and motor racing, the rest are merely games- Ernest Hemmingway.
 
sierra said:
I've been in one avalanche that carried me quite far and I have had a slope drop out from under me without sliding and was able to traverse off that slope. Winter travel involves risk, you can mitigate it, but you can't take it away. I solo and in both instances was by myself, had not dug a pit and just climbed along because things seemed good. If my incident made FB Im sure it would have been scrutinized to no end. Not that scientific, but imo, sometimes you just have bad luck out there, its not bowling. There are only three sports: bull fighting, mountain climbing and motor racing, the rest are merely games- Ernest Hemmingway.
Click to expand...
They say the third time's a charm.
 
dave.m said:
I've worked in a field in which risk management is central for over 30 years. IMO, all risk management entails reliance on heuristics and turns on human decision making that has been shaped by eons of evolutionary biology.

Generally risk is modeled as a statically based probability along the lines of Risk = Likelihood x Impact. Heated debate after this point is to be expected as the math gets very hand wavy very fast. And at the foundation of the mess is are unfounded assumptions that one has access to data that is comparable and statistically significant enough to be predictive.

IMO, you can't dig enough pits on the leeward aspects of the Presis to have any predictive confidence. Much better to take a safety engineering approach and treat likelihood as a binary and to focus one's risk judgement on the impact. If there is a non-zero likelihood of unstable conditions, just assume it will happen and make decisions accordingly (that is, simply don't go there).

There are 2 closely related human cognition issues that I hold to when dealing with risk. The first is the warfighter's problem in which there is a pre-commitment to the mission. In this case, you can't take the safety engineer's approach so one is more compelled to make risk judgements on heuristics, particularly around likelihoods. Often businesses approach risk in a manner similar to warfighters in that they are pre-committed to operating first and foremost and managing risk on the back end of that commitment.

A psychological factor for those of us who play in the mountains is whether we are warfighters or safety engineers. Mostly I think we (as a specie) are inherently "warfighters" who tend to pre-commit to a goal regardless of whether it's a matter of survival or recreation. Or putting it another way, our evolutionary biology wires us for dealing with heuristic judgments for survival but not so much for recreation.

The second issue is risk compensation theory, which I firmly believe plays a bigger role in managing recreational risk than we want to admit. As Paul Petzhold noted, if you carry a helmet, you're more likely to climb into the face of rock fall hazards.

I would have to be convinced that more avi pits would become trustablly predictive on likelihoods.
Click to expand...
The term "analysis paralysis" comes to mind here.

Petzold's comment is a bit strange: Is he saying helmet-less climbers are safer from rock fall than those using helmets, based on the premise that they will not attempt routes where rockfall is likely?
 
NHChris said:
Petzold's comment is a bit strange: Is he saying helmet-less climbers are safer from rock fall than those using helmets, based on the premise that they will not attempt routes where rockfall is likely?
Click to expand...

Roughly speaking, yes.

Petzold's statement is similar to a broader idea called risk compensation theory. It states that humans are psychologically wired to accept a certain level of risk. So, if a mitigation is introduced, they will engage in more risky behavior to compensate.

I think it's useful to think about it from the classic Risk = Likelihood x Impact formulation. A climbing helmet mitigates the impact of a rock strike. Petzold's comment can be stated as, if you mitigate the impact of a rock strike with a helmet, climbers will compensate by climbing routes with higher likelihoods of rock falls.

IMO, much of our backcountry safety gear plays into the problem of risk compensation. My personal choice is that I won't climb routes that "require" an ice axe, won't ski lines that require avi pits, and won't ski at areas that require ski helmets (power grooming + high speed lifts + shaped skis --> faster skier speeds + congested runs + slicker pistes --> greater likelihood of a fall resulting in a high speed slide and head injury.

I do however carry a rather inadequate but light first kit and an InReach Messenger so that my wife will sleep better when I'm out in solo trips because my lifelong buds are increasingly less likely to go out with me.

Which is to say, in some cases I take the Petzold or safety engineering approach and avoiding high risk choices even it means not doing certain things.

But in others, I take more of a warfighter or business approach. I precommit to solo hiking knowing it's higher risk. While I'll carry some mitigation tools like my InReach, I accept that I'm actually assuming higher risk by using it (compared to only going on trips with 1 or 2 partners).
 
dave.m said:
Roughly speaking, yes.

Petzold's statement is similar to a broader idea called risk compensation theory. It states that humans are psychologically wired to accept a certain level of risk. So, if a mitigation is introduced, they will engage in more risky behavior to compensate.

I think it's useful to think about it from the classic Risk = Likelihood x Impact formulation. A climbing helmet mitigates the impact of a rock strike. Petzold's comment can be stated as, if you mitigate the impact of a rock strike with a helmet, climbers will compensate by climbing routes with higher likelihoods of rock falls.

IMO, much of our backcountry safety gear plays into the problem of risk compensation. My personal choice is that I won't climb routes that "require" an ice axe, won't ski lines that require avi pits, and won't ski at areas that require ski helmets (power grooming + high speed lifts + shaped skis --> faster skier speeds + congested runs + slicker pistes --> greater likelihood of a fall resulting in a high speed slide and head injury.

I do however carry a rather inadequate but light first kit and an InReach Messenger so that my wife will sleep better when I'm out in solo trips because my lifelong buds are increasingly less likely to go out with me.

Which is to say, in some cases I take the Petzold or safety engineering approach and avoiding high risk choices even it means not doing certain things.

But in others, I take more of a warfighter or business approach. I precommit to solo hiking knowing it's higher risk. While I'll carry some mitigation tools like my InReach, I accept that I'm actually assuming higher risk by using it (compared to only going on trips with 1 or 2 partners).
Click to expand...
Agreed. If you listen to the patrollers at the large ski resorts, they believe that helmetless skiers (like me) ski more cautiously than those wearing helmets, and they have seen an uptick in serious core (torso) injuries as helmet use became more prevalent.
 
Mac said:
Agreed. If you listen to the patrollers at the large ski resorts, they believe that helmetless skiers (like me) ski more cautiously than those wearing helmets, and they have seen an uptick in serious core (torso) injuries as helmet use became more prevalent.
Click to expand...
"Never ski faster than you're willing to hit a tree"
-- Steve Barnett, Cross-Country Downhill
 
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