Strange Pattern to This Winter's Fatalities in the Whites

[WalksWithBlackflies]

Holmes chose to hike to one of the most exposed locations in the Whites at the start of one of the most bitter wind-chill episodes to hit the mountains in a long, long time.

- well said Peter.

I still remember that day. I met a fellow VFTT'r and went hiking in the woods near Syracuse. We chose this area for two reasons: 1) it was relatively protected from wind, and 2) though we hiked about 5 miles on well-trodden trails, the furthest we'd get from the parking lot was about 1 mile, allowing an easy bail-out if conditions warranted.

When I read about Ken, my heart sank, but I couldn't help but think "Why would he disregard such a weather report?" Maybe he took it as a challenge... don't know. I consider myself to be more "extreme" than the average hiker, but no way would I consider climbing a high peak that day.

Two tid-bits of info on that day that put the weather in perspective:

1) The daytime windchill on Mt. Washington (-94 F, 5am) and even in Syracuse (-30 F, afternoon) was lower than on Mt. Everest (-20 F, morning)
2) The actual high temperature on Mt. Washington (-23 F) and in Syracuse (-3 F) was colder than the surface of Mars at similar latitude (0 F)

 

[Mark]

Well said, dundare. I've heard the argument in risk discussions that "it's my life and I can take whatever risk I choose." However, we are never really alone on the trails. The lives of our friends and family are there with us by proxy and will be affected by our decisions.

I've taken to carrying photographs of my children with me when I hike. I try to keep them right there next to my map and compass to remind me of why I have to get back home, even if it means an early turn around.

This season was a wake up call for me. I hiked just as much as I usually do, but with more caution and much more respect for the mountains. I cancelled more hikes than I went on, but this is not unusual for me. I think I'm a better hiker for what I learned this winter. My risk tolerance has not kept me from enjoying the winter woods and summits, and I'm not done yet.

 

[Mark Driscoll]

Rico,

Where were you hiking near Syracuse? Was it Highland?

Mark

 

[maineguy]

Having said that, I personally don't think that the record-setting activity this winter has contributed to anyone's death.

This is of course true.

However, I believe that this record setting activity is just another manifestation of an underlying mindset which causes people to make some of these decisions.

Note: I make no judgement on this "underlying mindset", just an observation.

 

[Jack Waldron]

small mistakes

Most accident analyses identify one or more "mistakes". Those obvious mistakes are then blamed for the accident. I think that this approach is too simplistic. Frequently an accident is due to a series of small decisions. None of these decisions are glaring mistakes, but when taken in totality they result in a serious accident. This is a hypothetical scenario loosely based on the recent events on Lafayette.

A couple plans to hike the Franconia Ridge loop. The weather forecast is not promising. They bring the gear they have used successfully on this and similar hikes in the past. At the trailhead they decide to hike to Greenleaf hut and then reassess their plans. At Greenleaf hut the weather is deteriorating and other hikers comment on how risky it would be to hike the ridge today. They decide to cancel their plans to hike the ridge but will hike as far as treeline. If the winds and visibility are reasonable at treeline they'll try to tag Lafayette and return. Just below treeline, a second group heading up passes them. That group is also planning to tag Lafayette; all agree that hiking the ridge is too risky. At treeline the conditions are marginal. It's possible to see two cairns. The second group is already out of sight, heading to the summit. The couple decides to continue up. While the conditions are harsh, they are also exhilarating. This is a real challenge but they can consistently see one or two cairns and follow the trail. They meet the second group who are now descending. They report that the weather up top is fierce but that they did succeed in tagging the summit. When asked, the second group says that they left the summit about 10 minutes ago. Conditions are bad, but there are only about 10 minutes to go. The other group managed to make it, they are confident that their conditioning and stamina can deal with another 10 minutes of ascent. They reach the summit area, winds are fierce and visibility poor. They wander momentarily searching for the summit cairn. They find the summit cairn and turn to descend. It's difficult to find the first cairn. They finally find the first cairn, and then the second. Visibility is miserable but they keep their heads knowing they must follow the cairns. At each cairn one searches for the next cairn while the other watches the first. Slowly they are making progress. Even in the whiteout conditions the trail doesn't seem like Greenleaf, it's possible they are following the Franconia Ridge trail. They are successfully finding and following the cairns so they continue. Finally they reach a trail junction. It must be Falling Waters. The junction is the Skookumchuck. Where the hell is the Skookumchuck? They've never been here before and aren't familiar with these trails. They've been above treeline for a long time. The cold and wind are taking their toll. They are not sure where they are but they know they can't stay exposed above treeline for much longer. They decide to build a snow shelter and wait for a break in the weather.

There are about 10 decisions in this scenario. It's possible to second-guess any of them but I don't think that there is one glaring mistake. This sequence of decisions did incrementally and inexorably increase the couple's risks until they found themselves trapped in a snow shelter hoping the weather would break before they did.

 

[Jim lombard]

Jack, one thing to add to your text. The evidently didn't just tag the summit and descend. They took several pictures pictures first. I'm not going to second guess on anything they did. I've been on the summit several times and once in thick fog did the same thing they did.

 

[Maddy]

I recall reading a post that mentioned Ken Holmes had his sights set on climbing Everest in the future. I have since wondered if Ken might have wanted to climb in a remote area with arctic conditions to train for a summit bid on a higher, more challenging peak.
Climbers do train on the rockpile in winter to prepare themselves for attempts on Denali and in the Himalaya. Ken might not have shared this plan with anyone on that fatal weekend for fear that someone might try to convince him that it was unsafe. It appears that he was very determined to do this climb, to the point of hitchiking if he did not get a ride. I think most people with dreams like Ken are very driven to perform and take on serious challenges to prepare themselves for the higher summits.
We will never know the reasons why but we certainly have been left with much to ponder and a great sadness.

 

[Mike P.]

To add to Kevin's thought on the Ultra fit, Very few people made it back from a horrific storm during K2's worse season back in the 80's. About the only survivor from the top, Kurt Diemberger, hardly the poster boy for even moderately fit. Curently only living person to have been on first ascent of two 8,000 peaks.

 

[BrentD22]

This winter should be warning to ALL.

Even experianced, well equipped hikers can still run into situations they do not come back from alive! This being said I've promised my wife that I will no longer be hiking solo in winter conditions!

If anyone learns from these deaths please let it be to not be selfish. Most likely someone else out there depends and needs you. Don't risk your life alone to prove something to yourself. I agree completely with Sherpa's 4 man rule and I intend on following it from this point on!

 

[crazymama]

dundare -

I frequently arrange group hikes, especially in winter, and have noticed that ultra-fit hikers seem to have a harder time staying warm when stopping for breaks, and often need to start again before the main group is quite ready to go.

I couldn't find information specifically on ultrafit adults and their susceptibility to hypothermia. However, it is known that small infants are much more at risk for hypothermia for several reasons, two of which are lack of subcutaneous fat (which insulates), and increased ratio of surface area to body mass due to their small size.

The ultrafit tend to have little subcutaneous fat, and may tend to have less body mass that those that are unfit, thus rendering them more susceptible to the cold.

 

[Grumpy]

Interesting discussion . . .

The ultrafit tend to have little subcutaneous fat, and may tend to have less body mass that those that are unfit, thus rendering them more susceptible to the cold.

What's being suggested here in this whole discussion about the body fat question is that "fitness" may be a relative or qualified term. If that's the case, then the real question might be, "fit for what?"

G.

 

[maineguy]

What's being suggested here in this whole discussion about the body fat question is that "fitness" may be a relative or qualified term. If that's the case, then the real question might be, "fit for what?"

Excellent point. I once worked with a Biochemist who explained to me how ultra-fit athletes sometimes have great difficulty at high altitudes. Something about their bodies processing CO2 so efficiently at low altitudes that it causes problems (partial pressures, daltons law and all that...) at high altitudes. This seems to jive with reports I have read of iron-man tri-athlete winners not summiting McKinley while in the same group a 75 year old made it.

Yeah, I know slightly off the subject, but I thought it somewhat pertinent to the "what is fit" question.

 

[Ridgerunner]

On the same tangent

In 1961, on the Central Pillar of Freney in the Mont Blanc range (in France), Walter Bonatti was caught in a vicious storm that lasted many days. Many parties retreated on the glacier below and had to huddle (?) together for days. It ended up being the worst tragedy that ever happened in that area. People started dying, in the precise order of their age, starting with the youngest. If I recall, around 10 people died in that event.

 

[forty8]

Jack,

There's one thing you left out. I know it's been said before, but I think it bears repeating. Did they bring a compass with them? A quick check of direction on this $10 device in near zero visability conditions might have made the difference.

Let's all remember that.

 

[WalksWithBlackflies]

you'd need to take a bearing as you neared the summit so that you could be certain of the back-bearing. And, if you can't see the summit because of a whiteout ...

You'd know if you were going north or south...

 

[Jack Waldron]

I deliberately left out any mention of compass use when I created the hypothetical scenario. I wanted to create a "story" that could be discussed. I began with the publicly available information on the recent Lafayette tragedy. I embellished that information and connected the dots with a series of decision points.

Suggesting the use of a compass is a valid point. A change in behavior or decision-making at many points would have led to a different conclusion. In this tragedy and others involving "experienced" hikers, I think that the problems lay not so much in ignorance of appropriate gear or behavior but in the willingness to accept a small increase in risk by using less than recommended gear or behavior. We frequently call this behavior "pushing the envelope". "Pushing the envelope" is part of the learning process. Alternatively, a series of small, "pushing the envelope" decisions can create a very large and unanticipated risk exposure.

Assume that you had breakfast with the hypothetical couple before their hike and asked them whether they would hike to Lafayette in a whiteout carrying minimal gear and then follow the first cairn that they found assuming it must lead them to safety. The hypothetical couple would claim that experienced hikers, such as themselves, would never make such dumb decisions. They are right. They never made that dumb decision. But they did make a series of 10-15 small, "pushing the envelope" decisions that were equivalent to that same single dumb decision.

Fish and Game statements assigned blame for the Lafayette tragedy to both not carrying proper gear and failing to turn around in deteriorating weather. Superficially Fish and Game is correct. My question isn't what mistakes were made but why. What was the sequence of decisions that led to such an untenable situation? What was the motivation and reasoning behind each of those decisions? If the hiking community continues to focus on identifying what mistakes were made, but not investigating and understanding the decision making processes that lead to such high-risk situations then I don't think that we'll do much to prevent similar accidents in the future.

 

[JohnL]

Perhaps a thin case can be made with a small sample size that people with less body fat are more prone to chilling, hypothermia, body core cooling but that's thin ice to be sure. Take a look at this photo. The thin old guy in the middle has been standing in the same cold temps (20's) as the rest of the group and yet he's the only one not bundled up. In fact I was not even chilled until we broke up to start hiking again, at least 30 minutes after our initial stop. Why is that? Genetics? Environment? Cold weather training? Human oddity?

In WWII, it was found that of the seamen who were forced to abandon ship and went into chilling waters, the higher percentage that perished were the younger ones. Not the thinner ones but the younger ones. Hmmm.

I recently read (maybe on this BB) that some ice climbers accustom their hands to the cold by continually dunking them into ice water. Their blood vessels adapt to this environmental extreme and they are able to handle colder temps than other climbers. Reinhold Messner used to take baths in ice cold water to accustom his body to the rigors of the cold.

Some of the best high altitude climbers who climb in extreme weather conditions are smaller than your average bear. Take a look at the photos of these guys in some of the climbing books; Steve Venables in Ed Webster's "Storm Years on Everest"; Chris Bonington after getting down off the Ogre in "The Everest Years; Joe Simpson is probably 5'6" 135# with a pocketful of change; Dr Tom Hornbein, Rick Ridgeway, Messner, Peter Habeler, John Roskelley, Jeff Long, and on and on and on. These are not big burly guys but they seem to not have a problem dying on the mountain because of the cold. Sure, small people die on Everest and K2 all the time but did their bodies give out on them or did they just push it a bit too far? The same can be said for women climbers as well. Slight of build, strong, high endurance, tough core, predominantly lean.

So what killed Ken Holmes and Brenda Cox? In the case of the former, an unfortunate assessment of the degree of the cruel conditions coupled with a rare weather anomaly. In the case of the latter, poor planning and poor decisions. Their brains failed them, not their bodies.

JohnL

 

[dave.m]

Not to put too fine a point on it, but for a compass to have been effective near the summit cairns, you'd need to take a bearing as you neared the summit so that you could be certain of the back-bearing. And, if you can't see the summit because of a whiteout ...

I don't think a visible siting is needed to get a back bearing. A little research with a map before hand will give you the bearing needed. Related, I think it best to choose the bearing based on knowledge of terrain features (traps to be avoided, handrails to be used) and in such a way that you have know, built in error so you know for a fact which way to go to find the trail once you hit treeline. For example, I've used this approach for retreats off of Adams. Using an easily determined compass bearing, you can move along and above King Ravine so that when you hit treeline, you know you are just east of the Spur trail (if you haven't hit the Spur trail directly by then). It would be relatively straight forward imo to set a similar dead reckoning course from Lafayette summit to the general Greenleaf area. Now, actually being physically able make that hike straight into the teeth is another story...

Related, I think it is critical to have your compass readily available and secured *before* heading above treeline. Also critical to used to using it on calm clear days. A white out is a lousy place to practice and learn about the quirks of the tool.

NOTE: these are general observations about compass use. Please don't apply this to any woulda-coulda-shoulda analysis of any of the recent tragedies.

 

[maineguy]

Jack, I don't think you/we will ever get an answer as to why these decisions were made.

What makes people exceed the appropriate safe speed during our winter storms? I see cars spun out all over the road, yet still get passed by drivers far exceeding the safe limit. What makes them do it??? Note, they're not all driving SUVs by the way.

Who knows?

People make stupid decisions all the time in all walks of life every second of the day. Some decisions are just more stupid than others and carry a large pricetag.

 

[Stan]

rico makes a great point about the compass. In poor visibility it is so easy to become disoriented. Once on a summer bushwhack in low visibility I had to exercise great restraint not to deviate from the compass ... knowing that if I missed the road I'd probably be well on my way to Quebec. Be true to your compass.

John L has some persuasive anecdotes but I am not convinced that they lead to his conclusion. There is a stronger connection between the brain and than body than he credits.